Commentary : has financial development made the world riskier? by Donald L. Kohn
My perspective on this interesting paper by Raghu Rajan has been
very much influenced by observing Alan Greenspan’s approach to the
development of financial systems and their regulation over the past 18
years.1 I believe that the Greenspan doctrine, if I may call it that, has
reflected the chairman’s analysis and deeply held belief that private
interest and technological change, interacting in a stable macroeco-
nomic environment, will advance the general economic welfare.2
Chairman Greenspan has welcomed the ability of new technologies
in financial markets to reduce transactions costs, to allow the creation
of new instruments that enable risk and return to be divided and
priced to better meet the needs of borrowers and lenders, to permit
previously illiquid obligations to be securitized and traded, and to
make obsolete previous divisions among types of financial intermedi-
aries and across the geographical regions in which they operate. At the
intersection of market developments and monetary policy, he has led
the Federal Reserve’s efforts to understand the implications of chang-
ing financial technology, such as the growing ease of housing equity
extraction, and to use the newly available information about market
expectations and the price of risk embodied in market prices. 
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371The Greenspan doctrine holds that these developments, on balance,
improve the functioning of financial markets and the real economies
they support. By allowing institutions to diversify risk, to choose their
risk profiles more precisely, and to improve the management of the
risks they do take on, they have made institutions more robust. By
making intermediaries more robust and by giving borrowers a greater
variety of lenders to tap for funds, these developments also have made
the financial system more resilient and flexible—better able to absorb
shocks without increasing the effects of such shocks on the real
economy. And by facilitating the flow of savings across markets and
national boundaries, these developments have contributed to a better
allocation of resources and have promoted growth.
That is not to say that the Greenspan doctrine holds that private
markets always get it right. Prices in these markets are driven by the
tendency of human nature to project the recent past—to waves of
complacency and gloom—and, hence, are subject to overshooting.
And private parties, left entirely to their own devices, do not always
produce a market structure and market relationships consistent with
adequate protection of financial stability. However, the actions of
private parties to protect themselves—what Chairman Greenspan has
called private regulation—are generally quite effective. Government
regulation risks undermining private regulation and financial stability
by distorting incentives through moral hazard and by promising a more
effective role in promoting financial stability than it can deliver.
In this situation, government regulation has a function, but it should
be based on clear objectives, narrowly tailored to meet those objectives,
and, given the iron law of unintended consequences, it should be
clearly superior to private regulation. Regulation can be justified if
incentives for private regulation are weak—perhaps because of other
government programs, such as deposit insurance—or if market partic-
ipants are likely to be ineffective, as for example small savers and
borrowers. Regulation also may be justified to promote greater flow of
accurate information to enable private participants to make better
informed decisions.
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 New technologies and changing market structures imply that regu-
lation should be constantly under review; at times, rolling back
regulation—for example, by lifting the Glass-Steagall restrictions on
banking organizations—will benefit competition and help the finan-
cial sector deliver services more efficiently and effectively. Moreover,
regulation itself can benefit from competition. Running regulated
and unregulated markets side by side gives people a choice of whether
they want protection and helps to constrain regulation. Some of the
same purposes can be served by having multiple regulators for the
same function. In some circumstances, the possible adverse conse-
quences of competition in laxity may be smaller than the potential for
regulatory conformity and regulator risk-aversion to impinge on
innovation and change.
The Greenspan doctrine has had a perceptible influence on the
evolution of markets and the regulatory structure that applies to
them. Raghu Rajan voices some concerns about this evolution. In
particular, he posits that the shift from depository intermediation to
professional asset management has increased tail risk to socially exces-
sive levels and has left the world more vulnerable to rare but
potentially very serious tail events; he suggests some ways in which
regulation should be increased.
In assessing this argument, we might find it useful to separate the
question of whether the world is riskier from the question of whether
systemic risk has risen. The increased ability to disentangle risk and
tailor risk profiles should mean that risk has come to be lodged more
in line with investor appetites, a change that has probably tended to
reduce the price of risk and encouraged riskier capital projects to be
funded. But individual investors at greater risk need not imply
increased systemic risk—fatter tails and greater potential for losses
feeding back on the macroeconomy.
In fact, industrial economies have been marked by much less vari-
ability in output and inflation over the past 20 years. Many reasons
have been given for this so-called great moderation, but developments
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 in financial markets have likely played a role in making the economy
more resilient. As a consequence of greater diversification of risks and
of sources of funds, problems in the financial sector are less likely to
intensify shocks hitting the economy and financial market.
The experience of 2001-2003 is instructive. Unusually large
declines in equity prices and increases in defaults and risk spreads—
surely tail events by most definitions—reduced wealth and raised the
cost of capital but did not aggravate the downturn by impinging on
the flow of funds. Financial intermediaries were not so troubled as to
cut off the provision of credit, and in any case, many borrowers had
alternative sources of funds.
In addition, we have not seen a clear upward trend in volatility of
financial asset prices over the past 25 years, as one might expect if
herding had increased in importance. Judging from options prices,
market participants are expecting the volatility of financial asset prices
to be damped in the future; they also are requiring lower term premi-
ums for placing funds for longer terms.
I do not share Raghu’s nostalgia for the systemic-risk implications of
bank-dominated finance. Old-style crises involving impaired deposi-
tory institutions had substantial spillover effects; their repair took
time, during which, economic activity was affected, and emergency
measures to deal with them often involved moral hazard because they
were aimed at stabilizing ailing intermediaries. I think we would all
agree the industrial economy that has suffered the greatest systemic
strains from problems in the financial sector in the past 15 years is that
of Japan, which remained tied to the commercial bank model Raghu
finds safest. The macroeconomic effects of new-style crises involving
market liquidity, as in 1998, or outsized movements in asset prices
may be more readily cushioned by monetary policies aimed at bolster-
ing the general level of liquidity and reducing interest rates. Such
policies also carry less risk of increasing moral hazard.
374 Donald L. Kohn
 Although investment managers receive substantial funds directly
from households, many of their counterparties are sophisticated
investors in positions of fiduciary responsibility. In addition, most
asset managers are employees of institutions—mutual fund families,
bank holding companies—that are in the market for the long haul. It
is not in their interest to reach for short-run gains at the expense of
longer-term risk, to disguise the degree of risk they are taking for their
customers, or otherwise to endanger their reputations. I would expect
these counterparties and employers to enforce compensation schemes
that foster their objectives. As a consequence, I did not find convinc-
ing the discussion of market failure that would require government
intervention in compensation. Moreover, compensation regulation is
likely to be easily evaded and fraught with risks of untoward conse-
quences. One only has to recall the congressional action of 1993 that,
by imposing less-favorable tax treatment on some forms of executive
compensation, fostered the shift to stock options that in turn was
thought to have contributed to some of the transparency and corpo-
rate governance problems of the late 1990s.
Regulatory and supervisory systems do need to evolve to reflect the
shift to market-based transactions. As intermediation shifts from depos-
itories, with their specialized knowledge of borrowers, to markets,
disclosure and transparency become more important to allow diverse
private parties to assess risk properly, exert appropriate discipline, and
contribute to the efficient allocation of resources. Greater reliance on
markets also elevates the importance of the safety of clearing and settle-
ment systems. Private-sector participants have every incentive to
demand these disclosures and to ensure that their trades go through as
contracted. But government may need to act in concert with private
parties to arrive at collective decisions that strengthen markets and
reduce systemic risk but might not be in the interest of individuals acting
separately. And with more of the fluctuations in asset prices passing
through to a large number and wide variety of households, educating
people to make informed choices and protecting retail customers from
abusive practices remain key governmental functions.
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 A particularly interesting strand of the debate about excessive risk
taking concerns the interaction of monetary policy and perceptions of
risk in financial markets. Some analysts are concerned that several
aspects of the conduct of monetary policy in the United States have
induced market participants to reduce their expectations about risk
too far, setting up the financial markets and the economy for an
unpleasant and possibly destabilizing surprise.
In this view, the low short-term interest rates that policymakers have
thought were required over the past few years to meet macroeconomic
objectives are said to have encouraged reaching for yield—settling for
risk compensation that the investors themselves view as probably inad-
equate but which they feel compelled to accept, perhaps to achieve
targeted levels of real or nominal returns. The tendency of policy to
react strongly to sharp declines in key asset prices, and thereby limiting
the extent of the decreases, has been thought to induce risk taking by
imparting an asymmetry to asset price movements. Finally, a concern is
that the fairly new practice of telling the public about our expectations
for the path of the federal funds rate may have given market partici-
pants a false sense of security about the future path of policy.
These practices have been the result of a monetary policy focused
on price and economic stability over the intermediate term interact-
ing with the particular characteristics of the economy. The global
decline of inflation and spending induced a global reduction in inter-
est rates to unusually low levels in recent years. Those low rates were,
in fact, intended to stimulate risk taking and investment when private
agents pulled back. The tendency for asset prices to fall more quickly
than they rise has largely produced the more rapid and noticeable
response of stabilizing monetary policy to declines than to increases.
And the importance for economic performance of more accurate
expectations about monetary policy, along with the unusually low
policy rates, led the Federal Open Market Committee to undertake a
more extended discussion of its policy expectations.
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 To the extent that these policy strategies reduce the amplitude of
fluctuations in output and prices and contain financial crises, risks are
genuinely lower, and that development should be reflected in the
prices of assets. To the extent that the central bank can convey some-
thing useful about its intentions, markets that take account of these
intentions will be priced more accurately.
The risk is that private agents overestimate the ability or willingness
of central banks to damp volatility in asset prices or the economy, or
that they fail to appreciate that future policy actions depend on an
imperfectly predictable economic outlook. But developments should
have partially alleviated some of these concerns. Investors have had an
opportunity to observe that policy actions in 1987, 1998, and 2001-
2003 cushioned the economy, but they did not stop major declines
in the prices of equity in 1987 and 2001 or of risky credits in 1998.
Short-term rates have risen substantially in the past year, reducing the
profitability of “carry trades” without triggering an unwinding that
drove long-term interest rates higher or widened risk premiums. And
expectations that policy tightening would remain gradual over the
near-term have not stopped long-term rates from fluctuating substan-
tially in response to incoming data; the movements of future or
forward rates out the yield curve after surprises in data have been at
least as large since 2003 as they were before. 
That is not to say that we have nothing to worry about. As I already
noted, Alan Greenspan, himself, often has been concerned about
market complacency—as recently as his latest monetary policy testi-
mony. People may well perceive the economy as more stable than it
is or central banks with greater power than we have to smooth the
economy or to foresee our own actions.
Clearly, reminders to the public of the inherent uncertainty in
economic developments and policy responses are appropriate and
should have some effect. The question is whether these warnings
should be supplemented by actions to inject uncertainty into policy
pronouncements by saying less than we can or into the economy by
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 shifting our objectives away from seeking the best outcome for the
economy over the intermediate term. In my view, such policies would
result in less accurate asset pricing, reduce public welfare on balance,
and definitely be at odds with the tradition of policy excellence of the
person whose era we are examining at this conference.
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Endnotes
1The views are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of other members of
the Board or its staff. I thank Athanasios Orphanides, Matthew Pritsker, Patrick
Parkinson, and Vincent Reinhart, of the Board’s staff, for valuable comments.
2Chairman Greenspan has spelled out his views on markets and regulation in
many places, and much of what follows is my synthesis of this material. His
remarks on “Government Regulation and Derivative Contracts” on Feb. 21,
1997, are an especially valuable source for his approach to government regulation
of financial markets.
 